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　Introduction
　The essential function of language is to communicate matters, and it 
is critical that in so doing ambiguity or equivocation in meaning should 
not be produced.　See the following sentence as an example;
I won’t marry her because she comes of a wealthy family.
　It is possible to understand the meaning of the sentence in terms of 
two directly opposite interpretations: either “It is not the case that I 
will marry her because she comes from a wealthy family,” (I will marry 
her) or “I don’t intend to marry her.  The reason is that she comes 
from a wealthy family” (I will not marry her).  In this case, considering 
the scope of operation of the word “not,” it is common to interpret 
the sentence in terms of the former interpretation, and when wishing 
to communicate the latter interpretation a comma (,) would be added 
before “because” in writing, and a pause would come before “because” in 
speech. 
　However, while the above English sentence example may be treated 
as a joke, in the case of our country, where diplomacy is conducted in 
a foreign language (mainly English), the interpretation of the foreign 
language or the Japanese translation can sometimes prescribe the 
political conditions of the country in the future and can even invite a 
situation that determines “war and peace.”  To put it differently, if no 
clear problem in the writing style can be found, there may occur an 
interpretation that is vague or arbitrary in terms of national conditions 




or from a strategic point of view. 
  In this essay, I would like to introduce three cases of such occurrences 
in the modern Japanese diplomacy.  The first is what happened under 
the occupation of Japan by the Allies immediately after its defeat in 
World War II; specifically, the Japanese version of Article 9 of the 
Constitution of Japan will be taken up, which still remains an obstacle 
to a clear and unified understanding of the article among the Japanese 
people due to the fact that it was hastily put into Japanese from English 
in the extreme situation where Japan had no national sovereignty. 
Secondly, discussed is the issue of the Japanese government’s 
interpretation of the English language in the Potsdam Declaration. 
Finally, focused upon is what I believe is a case of the Japanese 
government having made an arbitrary interpretation of English from its 
strategic viewpoint in making the decision to enter World War I.
１ ．The Ambiguity of Clause 1, Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan
―“war as a sovereign right” and “the threat or use of force as a 
means of settling international disputes”
　On August 10, 1945, Japan communicated its acceptance of the 
Potsdam Declaration to the Allied Powers. One of the subjects about 
the declaration discussed within the Japanese government was that 
it demanded that the Imperial Japanese Constitution promulgated 
during the Meiji era be revised.  In October of the same year, Douglas 
MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), indicated 
to Konoe Fumimaro, the then Minister of State in the Higashikuni 
Cabinet, that the Imperial Constitution would be revised.  The 
constitutional revision began officially in February 1946, however, when 
MacArthur commanded Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, General 
Headquarters’ (GHQ) Chief of the Government Section, to draft the new 
Japanese constitution (the so-called “MacArthur Notes”).  Wasting no 
time, the GHQ draft, based on MacArthur’s wishes, was handed to the 
Japanese government and in March of that year, a Japanese draft was 
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produced and publically released.  Immediately thereafter, GHQ worked 
through the night doing final work on the draft.  It was promulgated as 
the Constitution of Japan on November 3, after having passed through 
deliberations and partial revisions in the Imperial Diet. ⑴
　Above, I have outlined the process by which the Japanese Constitution 
was born.  As a result of this process, there has been confusion amongst 
Japanese people since then and lasting until the present time about the 
interpretation of the linguistic context of Article 9, which prescribes 
the renunciation of war.  There are multiple places in Article 9 where 
the meaning is either unclear or ambiguous, but here I will focus on the 
following two points. 
① 　The discrepancy between “war as a sovereign right of the nation” 
and “the threat or use of force as a means of settling international 
disputes” in the Japanese version
　In the original MacArthur Notes, it says that
　War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished.　Japan renounces 
it as instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its 
own security.  It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring 
the world for its defense and its protection.  No Japanese army, navy, or 
air force will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever 
be conferred upon any Japanese force.
　In response, the GHQ draft states that
　War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished.  The threat or use 
of force is forever renounced as a means of settling disputes with any 
other nation.
　No army, navy, air force or other war potential will ever be authorized 
and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon the State.
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　And in the final wording of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan that 
was drafted based on the GHQ draft and promulgated, it says that
　Article 9： 　Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on 
justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce 
war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or 
use of force as a means of settling international disputes.
　　　　　　 　In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding 
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other 
war potential, will never be maintained.  The right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
　What first deserves our attention here is that the wording in the 
MacArthur Notes “even for preserving its own security” is entirely 
deleted in the GHQ draft.  The fact behind this deletion is that Colonel 
Kades (Charles Louis Kades), who had been involved in the drafting of 
the constitution at the GHQ deleted this section and that MacArthur 
tacitly allowed the deletion.  Originally, MacArthur had intended to take 
from Japan even the right to fight for its self-defense; in other words, it 
may be inferred that he intended to make Japan’s continued existence 
permanently dependent upon America.  To go as far as to take a nation’s 
right to self-defense, however, must have been considered unrealistic.  In 
light of this background to the establishment of the present constitution, 
the will of the legislators of Clause 1 of Article 9 would seem to 
acknowledge war of self-defense, but the Japanese version of this part of 
the article has been a barrier to this interpretation.
　This obstruction lies in the fact that whereas the part that reads “the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right” in English is 
rendered as “forever renounces war as an exercise of a sovereign right” 
in Japanese, the part that reads in English “the threat or use of force 
as a means of settling international disputes” as “(forever renounces) 
the threat made by force or the use of force in terms of their being a 
means of resolving international disputes” in Japanese.  In other words, 
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because “as a sovereign right of the nation” is taken as an adjective 
phrase, and the directly preceding word “war” seem to suggest the 
identical situation (apposition) of “war as an exercise of sovereignty,” 
this makes possible an interpretation in which even war of self-defense 
is prohibited.  This is because war of self-defense is precisely the basis 
of a nation’s sovereign rights.  However, the part directly following 
that says “as a means of settling international disputes” is taken as an 
adverbial phrase and is rendered as “in terms of its being (toshite wa) a 
means of settling international disputes.”  What deserves our attention 
here is the word “dispute.”  This word is typically used to designate the 
stage in which “the use of physical force” is not employed, meaning the 
stage where “the use of physical force” is not used in an international 
forum.  Therefore, the correct understanding of the English version is 
“threatening the use of force or using force against another party at the 
stage of a dispute where force has not been used,” in other words, “Japan 
forever renounces invasive war.”  Interpreted conversely, it is natural to 
understand this as meaning that Japan does not renounce other uses of 
force, namely, war of self-defense.  This precisely means not “as a means 
of resolving international disputes,” but “in terms of its being (toshite wa) 
a means of resolving international disputes.”  Typically, the Japanese 
phrase “toshite wa” is used when comparing one thing to another.  For 
example, this can be seen in a usage such as “it makes a good snack, but 
it is not enough in terms of its being a supper meal.” ⑵
　What complicates the issue even further is that the Japanese word for 
“dispute” (funso) includes both simple verbal debate and armed military 
conflict.  This is clear from the phrase “armed disputes.” (buryoku funso) 
As previously stated, however, given that “dispute” in English cannot be 
interpreted along these lines, the placement of the phrase “the threat or 
use of force” directly before “international disputes” becomes “the threat 
or use of force as a means of resolving armed conflict between nations,” a 
meaningless and redundant repetition. ⑶
　In this way, It can be pointed out that the political conditions 
surrounding Article 9 and the Self-Defense Forces have been prescribed 
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by the fact that everything after the preposition “as” in the first half 
is translated as an adjective phrase, giving the Japanese version the 
meaning that resorting to armed force for self-defense, which is naturally 
included in the exercise of sovereign rights, should be renounced, and 
by the fact that, in the latter half, everything after “as” is taken as an 
adverbial phrase, giving it the interpretation that it is possible to wage 
war for self-defense.
② 　The consistency between “renounce war” and “the right of 
belligerency will not be recognized”
　It is not a mistake to translate “the right of belligerency” into 
Japanese as “kosenken” (the right to engage in war).  However, insofar as 
Clause 1 already declares the “renunciation of war,” there would be no 
reason for such a nation to have a right to wage war, and Clause 2 does 
nothing to add a negation of the right to make war.　Therefore, this 
was understood by the Japanese government at the time to mean “the 
rights of belligerents” to conduct inspections and seizures in policing 
contraband during wartime.　As corroboration of this point, it may be 
observed that the MacArthur Notes and the GHQ draft use the plural 
form of “rights.”  Moreover, from the viewpoint of English expression 
as well, typically “the rights of belligerents” would be a countable noun 
that has concrete rights in mind, so that the aggregate of these rights 
would be expressed in terms of the plural form “rights.”  For whatever 
reason, however, in the final original version created by GHQ with the 
participation of the Japanese government, this was altered to become 
the singular form of “right.”
　However, if the meaning is “belligerent(s),” then writing “belligerent(s),” 
which recognizes the concrete existence of “belligerent(s),” would be 
more appropriate than the uncountable noun “belligerency,” which 
expresses an abstract concept, and the MacArthur Notes, the GHQ draft 
and the final wording in the Constitution of Japan all use the abstract, 
uncountable noun of “belligerency.”
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　Thus, the Japanese version of “the right of belligerency of the state, 
though perhaps not a mistranslation, together with the words “renounces 
was as an act of national sovereignty” and “as a means of resolving 
international conflict,” has been a factor causing confusion in terms of 
how Article 9 ought to be interpreted right up to the present day.
２．Interpretations of the Potsdam Declaration
　The Potsdam Declaration was issued by the three countries of the 
United States, Britain, and China as the ultimatum to Japan during the 
end of the Pacific War (July 1945).  Simply stated, in any war, it is the 
victor that imposes its conditions upon the defeated, and this declaration 
as well presented these conditions.
　It is well-known regarding this declaration that Suzuki Kantaro, the 
then Prime Minister, stated in a press conference that “the Japanese 
government will ‘disregard’ (mokusatsusuru) the Potsdam Declaration.” 
Prime Minister Suzuki himself likely intended to say that he had 
no comment on the declaration, but this exchange with the Prime 
Minister was reported abroad by the Associated Press with the word 
mokusatsusuru translated as “ignore.” ⑷  If this translation may be 
considered one of the factors leading to the dropping of the atomic 
bombs, it is truly no overstatement to say that it was a case where the 
interpretations of Japanese and English determined the fate of Japan 
and its people.  Why, then, was the Japanese government not able to 
make a clear response to this declaration?  One reason is that it was 
anticipated that accepting the declaration would lead to a military revolt, 
but there is also a related premise here pertaining to the interpretation 
of the declaration, which was issued in English. 
　The issue that Japan concerned itself with most concerning how 
to end the war was the position of the emperor.  In the Potsdam 
Declaration issued by the three nations of the United States, Britain, 
and China, there was no clear statement of how the emperor would be 
treated.  The following articles may be cited as having some bearing 
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upon the Japanese political regime after being defeated. 
　Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender
10 ．We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race 
or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all 
war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our 
prisoners.  The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to 
the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the 
Japanese people.  Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as 
well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.
12 ．The occupying forces of Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan 
as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has 
been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the 
Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.
13 ．We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the 
unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide 
proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. 
The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.
　（Underlines added by author）
 
　It is stated in Article 10 of the declaration that “stern justice will 
be meted out to all war criminals,” but whether or not the emperor 
would be a war criminal or the emperor system would be viewed as 
an “obstacle” to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies 
cannot be determined by an unequivocal interpretation.  Moreover, 
in the section of Article 12 that discusses the establishment of “a 
peacefully inclined and responsible government,” both interpretations of 
maintaining or abolishing the emperor system are possible as options, as 
long as “the freely expressed will of the Japanese people” can be found. 
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Furthermore, Article 13 says “unconditional surrender,” and the word 
“unconditional” certainly implied that Japan had to be prepared for the 
abolition of the emperor system by the Allied Powers, but at the same 
time, this word “unconditional” also leaves room for the possibility that 
the system would be allowed to survive.  Therefore, the path tread by 
the Japanese leadership after coming into contact with the Potsdam 
Declaration may be taken as an example of how all their interpretations 
of English were decided in the political landscape of that time.
　The situation of the time was that, following the defeats on the 
war fronts and the intensification of indiscriminate aerial bombings, 
diplomacy toward ending the war was developing.  Japanese diplomacy 
was seeking the favor of the Soviet Union in the hope of attracting it 
into a mediating role, while the communist power kept secret its already 
strengthened determination to enter the war.  Amidst this context, in 
February 1945, Konoe made a direct appeal to the throne, stating that,
 
　 　I believe that the defeat in the war is unfortunately already 
inevitable...the greatest cause for concern from the standpoint of 
preserving the national polity is...the communist revolution that would 
occur with the defeat...from the viewpoint of preserving the national 
polity, a path toward concluding the war should be made without a 
single day’s delay...I believe the greatest obstacle lying in the path 
is the presence of a group within the military...conducting a reform 
of the military is a precondition for saving Japan from a communist 
revolution... ⑸
　Not only is this appeal noteworthy for being an opinion to the throne 
regarding plans to end the war, but it is also fascinating that what 
Konoe and the leadership around him feared most was the destruction 
of the Imperial Household through a communist revolution occurring 
in the army as a result of continuing the war.  However, what deserves 
even greater attention is that Konoe, who at the time of the Versailles 
Peace Conference published his essay “Overcoming Anglo-American-
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Centered Peace,” and had thereafter held that Japan’s national policies 
since the Manchurian Incident were the inevitable destiny that Japan 
had to follow, and actively defined the Pacific War as “emancipation 
from the bonds of Europe and America,” placed all the responsibility for 
this war, which was supposed to have been an act of emancipation, on a 
faction within the military and the purpose of ending the war early by 
fanning the fear of a communist revolution was to “protect the national 
polity.” ⑹
　Togo Shigenori, who was the Foreign Minister at the beginning of 
the Pacific War and was reappointed to this position in the Suzuki 
Kantaro Cabinet, which replaced the Koiso Cabinet in April 1945, had 
already said to Japan’s senior statesmen in 1943, “It may be concluded 
that if the tide of the war keeps getting worse in this way, our defeat 
will be inevitable…it is clear that we will be defeated if we do not make 
a great reform now.”  The great reform of which Togo was speaking 
meant taking back the helm of politics and diplomacy, which had been 
under the control of the military, and seizing the initiative to end the 
war, yet his purpose in so doing was not the “emancipation of Asia,” 
but to prevent the conservative stratum of Japanese society from being 
overthrown through a social revolution and to protect the Imperial 
Household that was the symbol of the ruling class.
　 　When the tide of the war finally turns toward our defeat, unless 
we manage the situation well; the result might be not only a political 
revolution, but could go so far as to trigger a social revolution...it is 
also clear that the forces of the laboring masses are growing, but the 
Imperial Household must be protected no matter what may happen.
　 That the defeat in the war would lead to our suffering some 
punishment will be unavoidable, but the question is to what extent. 
It is indispensable not to have fatal conditions placed upon us, and 
therefore I thought that to end the war would be definitely required 
before our national power entirely wasted away... ⑺
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　Like Konoe’s appeal examined above, these words express the fear 
that the disasters accompanying the continuation of the war would 
become a fuse leading to the collapse of the traditional ruling order that 
was centered around the Imperial Household and that inside and outside 
the country the Emperor would be implicated as a war criminal.  In 
light of these intentions among the ruling class, it is quite natural that 
the tracks traced by the Japanese leaders from the announcement of the 
Potsdam Declaration to Japan’s acceptance of its terms converged upon 
“upholding the national polity.”  This can be said to have been precisely 
an example of arbitrary interpretations made by those who feared that 
their own base of power might be overturned.
３ ．Japan’s Entry into World War I based upon an Arbitrary 
Interpretation
　The issue of an arbitrary interpretation of English leading to Japan’s 
entry into World War I is discussed in detail in Hirama Yoichi’s 
“Language And Diplomacy: Interpretations That Change according 
to National Interests—the Example of World War I.” ⑻  On August 7, 
1914, British Ambassador to Japan Conygham Greene handed Foreign 
Minister Kato Takaaki a telegram from Britain, then engaged in war 
with Germany, requesting Japan to hunt out and sink German armed 
merchant cruisers that were blocking British trade routes in Chinese 
waters.  There are some works arguing that a mistranslation of this 
telegram resulted in Japan’s entry into World War I, ⑼ but Hirama 
concludes that it was an arbitrary interpretation based on the deliberate 
intent of Foreign Minister Kato that led to Japan’s entry into the war. ⑽ 
The telegram reads; 
　Most Urgent
　As some time will be needed in order that our ships of war may find 
and destroy German ships in Chinese waters, it is most important that 
the Japanese fleet should, if possible, hunt out and destroy the armed 
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German merchant cruisers who are now attacking our commerce.
　If the Imperial Government would be good enough to employ some 
of their men of war, thus, it would be of the greatest advantage to His 
Majesty's Government.
　This of course means an act of war against Germany, but this is, in 
our opinion, unavoidable.
　The issue hinges on the last sentence (This is, in our opinion, 
unavoidable.)  As previously stated, Hirama disagrees with the view 
that the Japanese government decided to enter into the war against 
Germany based on a mistranslation of this section, arguing instead that 
Foreign Minister Kato’s deliberately arbitrary interpretation is what 
led Japan to enter the war.  To be sure, the “this” in the sentence “This 
of course means” when immediately followed by “an act of war against 
Germany, means “To hunt out and destroy the armed German merchant 
cruisers,” but it is possible to interpret the “this” in “this is, in our 
opinion, unavoidable” in the following two ways. 
① 　Hunting out and sinking armed German merchant cruisers means of 
course an act of war against Germany, but this (an act of war against 
Germany) is, in our opinion, unavoidable.
② 　Hunting out and sinking armed German merchant cruisers means 
of course an act of war against Germany, but this (to hunt out and 
destroy the armed German merchant cruisers) is, in our opinion, 
unavoidable.
　Which of these interpretations, then, matches Britain’s intention? 
I support the view that argues that Britain’s request was only for 
a limited use of force by the Japanese navy in Chinese waters, and 
that it was not a request for Japan’s full entry into the war.  The 
most important reason for supporting this argument is that because 
regardless of the fact that Britain was the world’s strongest power at 
the time, it would most likely have refrained from making an arrogant 
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use of pressure such as commanding another country to enter into the 
war. ⑾
　As the grounds for refuting the argument that holds that Japan 
decided to declare war on Germany by mistranslating the telegram 
in terms of ① instead of the correct interpretation ②, Hirama cites 
the facts that under the international conditions surrounding Japan 
at that time, Foreign Minister Kato could have confirmed with the 
British government in advance through Ambassador Greene, but in 
spite of this, he decided together with Prime Minister Okuma to enter 
the war within 36 hours of receiving the telegram, and also that upon 
receiving this request, Kato stated in a meeting with Greene that,“I am 
uncertain how it would be to limit military activities to armed cruisers, 
but at any rate, I will study the question and make a reply,” indicating 
his understanding that the request was for a limited use of force.  In 
other words, Hirama argues that the foreign language of the telegram 
was interpreted arbitrarily in order to have it in concord with Japan’s 
national interests on the stage of international politics. ⑿
　Conclusion
　As shown above, I have introduced such examples as Article 9 of the
Constitution of Japan, the wording of the Potsdam Declaration, and the 
telegram about Japan’s entry into World War I.  They are all cases 
where interpretations of a foreign language were made ambiguously or 
arbitrarily under the (international) political conditions of the time.  As 
the essential function of language of communicating matters is based 
upon the goal of maintaining and expanding one’s own interests, it has 
been an eternal and immutable truth ever since humanity gained the 
infinite means of communication of language that linguistic expressions 
do not faithfully reflect objectivity.  Of course, this applies to the forum 
of modern international politics and is also true of today, which has seen 
more than a half century since the end of World War II.
　The importance of the ability to use foreign languages, particularly 
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the world language of English, is undeniable, but whether in the case 
of individuals or nations, in political forums where the authoritative 
allocation of scarcity value is inevitable, arbitrary interpretation of 
ambiguous language lying at the periphery of meaning is inescapable. 
In today’s Japan, where the use of Western languages deluges the 
public, and the common agreement for such vocabulary as “globalization” 
and “friendship” is vague, it is particularly important not to forget this.
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German ships based upon a stretched interpretation of Britain’s 
limited request...If he had confirmed with Britain, the scope of 
Japanese strategy would have, in accordance with Britain’s intention, 
been limited to destroying armed merchant ships around the Chinese 
sea and the occupation of Micronesia would have been impossible. 
Had he accurately translated and circulated the telegram, this would 
have given a basis for the argument of Yamagata Aritomo and other 
Japanese elder statesmen who were strongly opposed to entering the 
war.  Perhaps for this reason, while it was customary at this time for 
foreign telegrams to be circulated with their Japanese translations, 
this telegram was not translated in writing, but was only orally put 
into Japanese during cabinet meetings, and even in the Foreign 
Ministry ed., Nihon no Gaiko Bunsho (Japan’s Diplomatic Documents), 
vol.3, 1914, there are translations for almost all of the other important 
telegrams, but no translation for this telegram can be found.” (Hirama, 
op.cit., p.62)
